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Abstract

Mobile agents are programs that can migrate from machine to machine in a heterogeneous,
partially disconnected network. As mobile agents move across a network, they consume resources. We discuss a system for controlling the activities of mobile agents that uses electronic
cash, a banking system, and a set of resource managers. We describe protocols for transactions
between agents. We present xed-pricing and dynamic-pricing policies for resources. We focus
on and analyze the sealed-bid second-price auction as a mechanism for dynamic pricing.

1 Introduction
Mobile agents are programs that can migrate from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network.
The program chooses when and where to migrate. It can suspend its execution at an arbitrary point,
jump to another machine and resume execution on the new machine. Thus, mobile agents co-locate
data and computation by bringing the computation to the data, rather than by bringing the data
to the computation. Agents have the necessary autonomy to make decisions, and to interact with
other agents and services to accomplish their goals. Our previous research [RGK, KGN 97] shows
that mobile agents have tremendous promise as a uniform paradigm for developing distributed
applications, primarily because agents are easier to write than message- or RPC-based applications,
their autonomy makes them well suited to poorly connected network environments, and they remove
the need for distributed applications to have their own control language.
As mobile agents move across a network, they consume resources. How can we prevent agents
from over-utilizing or wasting the resources on the computers they visit?
A realistic mobile-agent system must be able to work e ectively in a heterogeneous, distributed
environment. In the course of its lifetime, a single agent may visit many di erent types of machines,
which run di erent operating systems, and are administered by di erent organizations with di erent
policies and goals. If a mobile-agent system is to work in such a situation, it is critical for the
system architecture to include mechanisms for controlling resource usage, and include hooks to
allow customization of the resource-control policies. Resources include everything from CPU time
+
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to screen space. The resource owners (i.e., the machines and their owners) need to control the
quantity of resources used by each agent, particularly agents that are not owned by the same user
or organization. It is not sucient for each machine to control an agent's local resource usage, as
might a traditional operating system; the agent's lifetime resource usage must also be controlled, to
prevent agents from circulating forever. The agents themselves need to control their own resource
usage, not only to optimize their own performance but also to respond e ectively to limits imposed
on them by the resource owners.
In this paper we present the market-based resource-control component of our mobile-agent
system called D'Agents. The D'Agents system supports inter-agent economic transactions with a
system infrastructure consisting of a currency model, a banking system, and a set of currency-aware
resource managers. This infrastructure allows (1) resource managers to set prices for resources and
(2) agents mobile to dynamically adapt to the resource-pricing environment to meet their goals
within their resource constraints. We propose to use sealed-bid, second-price auctions to enable the
resource managers to set prices dynamically in response to changing conditions, based on a set of
abstract priorities set by their human owner. We present a lower bound for the the wait time in a
sealed-bid second-price auction and discuss simulation experiments.
This paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of related work, Section 3 gives
a overview of our mobile-agent system D'Agents. Section 4 describes the currency model, the
distributed banking system, the resource managers, the protocols for transactions between agents,
and an application that uses them to support a traveling salesperson. In Section 5 we discuss
dynamic resource pricing with auctions, analyze auctions with respect to an agent's waiting time
to receive a service, and present simulation results from running auctions among agents. We wrap
up with a discussion in Section 6.
1

2 Related Work
Mobile agents permit the migration of an agent (a computation) to a data source. This process co-location enhances programmers' exibility in much the same manner as does multithreaded programming, by allowing software authors another dimension to express solutions.
D'Agents [Gra97, KGN 97] and Telescript [Whi94] are examples of systems supporting this form of
migratory computation. Allowing processes to relocate, however, reinforces the importance of regulation. Social systems have evolved markets as simple distributed solutions to limiting consumption
and facilitating trade.
Markets not only allow resource owners to rent out their capital for outside use, but place a
limit on the lifetime of mobile processes by tying consumption to a limited currency pool. There
have been several major approaches to setting prices in computational markets: sealed-bid auctions,
reservation-style resource options, and priority pricing. Spawn [WHH 92] is an example of a system
using second-price sealed-bid auctions to distribute resources. In Spawn, tasks compete for resources
by submitting bids to the resource's owner. Bids can be expressed in a more complex manner than a
simple price in systems like WALRAS [Wel96] where agents submit demand functions expressing the
quantity desired at given prices. The market then computes a clearing price for goods. Waldspurger
and Weihl [WW96] describe their allocation framework for selling shares that represent options
for processor use. Holding a share ensures that an agent will receive a fraction of processor use
+

+

1

Previously known as Agent Tcl.

2

proportional to the number of shares in circulation. Finally, it is possible to x prices for multiple
levels of service quality as described in [GSW97]. Prices can periodically be calibrated to match
changing demand and encourage responsible consumption.
Markets require a mechanism to ensure reliable and legitimate transactions among agents. We
propose using a trusted third party as an arbiter, though that is not the only solution. Sandholm
[SL95] proposes game-theoretical situations where trade is likely to be safe given the maximum loss
of a single transaction and the e ect of defaulting on one's reputation. By adding a penalty for
decommitting [SL96], agents can be persuaded to act in responsible fashion, while still having the
exibility to back out of a transaction in an emergency.

3 D'Agents: a Mobile Agent System
D'Agents [RGK, Gra97, KGN 97] was developed to support mobile agents written in Agent Tcl,
Agent Java, and Agent Scheme (extensions of Tcl, Java, and Scheme, respectively) over the past
two years. The primary goal of the project has been to implement a computational paradigm that
co-locates data and computation by bringing the computation to the data (rather than the data to
the computation). D'Agents supports this paradigm with mobile agents, which are programs that
can migrate under their own control from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network. In other
words, the program can suspend its execution at an arbitrary point, migrate to another machine,
and resume execution on the new machine. Mobile agents are especially suited for applications on
disconnected computers such as laptops and palmtops that require ltering through large amounts
of data.
D'Agents reduces migration to a single instruction, provides simple communication among
agents, and runs on generic Unix platforms. Our modi ed Tcl, Java, and (coming soon) Scheme
interpreters can capture the internal state of an executing script (the stack, the contents of variables, etc.) at an arbitrary point. In addition, our modi ed interpreters provide a special set of
commands that allow a program to migrate to other machines and to communicate with other
migrating agents.
Thus, one of our mobile agents is simply a Tcl, Java, or Scheme program that runs in modi ed
interpreters and uses the agent commands to roam through a network and interact with other
agents. The program can decide to move to a new machine at any time. It issues the agent jump
command, which suspends script execution, captures and packages the internal state of the script,
and sends this state image to an agent server on the destination machine (a special server runs on
every machine to which mobile agents can be sent). The server restores the state image and the
Tcl script continues execution on the new machine from the exact point at which it left o .
Our agents can communicate via message passing, stream connections, or remote procedure
call [KGN 97]. An agent can use the Tk toolkit to present a graphical user interface on either its
home machine or on a remote machine to which it has migrated.
D'Agents protects individual machines from malicious agents (as well as groups of machines that
are under single administrative control) [Gra97, Gra96].
+
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4 Resource Control
As mobile agents move across a network, they consume resources. How can we prevent agents
from over-using or wasting the resources on the computers they visit? We developed a system for
controlling the activities of mobile agents that uses electronic cash, a banking system, and a set of
resource managers. In the following sections we describe the prototypes for each of these modules.
These prototypes are modularized to enable easy experimentation with di erent resource managers,
electronic cash models, and banking models.

4.1 Electronic Cash

To provide the necessary exibility, autonomy, and decentralized control required in a distributed
system of mobile agents, we developed a resource-control prototype based on a currency model.
Our goal was to develop a protocol by means of which all machines and agents agree on a common
currency unit (not necessarily tied to legal currency).
Agents carry with them a nite amount of currency, which they pay to resource owners for the
resources they use. As a result, agents have the freedom to choose how to spend their currency
on resources. They can dynamically trade o space and time, for example, once they have seen
the relative cost of the necessary resources, according to their own encoded priorities. In addition,
resource owners have the freedom to choose how to price their resources. A workstation owner that
does not wish to see its CPU bogged down by outside agents will set a high price on its CPU time.
Another workstation owner may nd it has surplus CPU cycles, memory pages, disk blocks, and so
forth, and may choose to price its resources more competitively. Alternatively, the resource prices
can be set dynamically using the policies described in Section 5.
2

4.2 The Banking System

We developed a distributed system of banks to manage currency (although we developed a simple
protocol of our own, we plan to consider existing approaches used for Internet or smart-card commerce) using on-line protocols that allow agents to talk to their banks while executing a transaction.
We have also addressed o -line protocols in the case where the buyer and seller agent are willing to
trust each other through the mediation of a trusted third party. The o -line protocols are especially
important when mobile agents operate on disconnected devices such as laptops.
The banking system functions as follows. There are a small number of bank agents, which have
the authority to issue currency. The banks trust each other. (In a real system, it is likely that
the banks would be run by accredited organizations and carefully regulated, much as the banks in
today's real world.) Each bank has a well-known public key, and a secret private key. (We use PGP
for our public-key cryptosystem.)
Every machine and application agent that needs to handle currency contracts with the bank of
their choice. They need only know and trust that one bank.
In our model, all agents, machines, and resources are ultimately owned by some person or
organization. Thus, the currency collected through the sale of resources accumulates in the name of
the resources' owners. Those entities may then allocate currency to agents that they wish to send
out for their own business.
2
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All currency is kept in wallets; a wallet is a set of bills ; each bill is a unique, cryptographically
signed document issued by one of the accredited banks. Each user and agent has its own wallet.
Each bill is just a few bytes of information, indicating the name of the bank, the amount of the
bill, the unique identifying number for that bill, and the bank's signature. The bank's signature is
generated using its public key, and depends on all of the other bits in the bill. The authenticity of
any bill can be quickly veri ed by checking the signature.
This agent banking system can be extended to include human users who might interact with
the agents. Each computer user would have their own wallet, as would each organizational entity.
If the machines are owned by the organization, then they would accumulate currency through the
sale of their resources, and distribute currency to their personnel to satisfy their needs.
When a user creates an agent, the user gives the agent a few bills for its wallet. As it travels
the network, the agent must buy all of its resources, using this currency. This includes CPU time,
disk space, queries, etc. If the agent runs out of currency, it can execute no longer. We expect host
systems will have enough charity to send the agent back to its home machine, or at least to send a
death notice to the home machine.

4.3 Transactions Using Electronic Cash

Suppose agent A wishes to pay agent B for a resource or service. In the simplest case, agent A has
a bill in its wallet for exactly the correct amount. It gives that bill to agent B, that is, the bits are
copied from some variable in agent A to some variable in agent B. (If necessary, this transmission
can be encrypted with the public key of agent B to prevent other agents from intercepting the bill.)
Agent B adds the bill to its wallet, and agent A removes the bill from its wallet.
To prevent the same bill from being used twice, agent B should validate the bill when it is
received. The following protocol accomplishes this. Agent B sends the bill to its bank, bank B.
Bank B sends the bill to the bank that issued the bill, Bank A. Bank A validates the authenticity of
the bill and records the fact that it has been used, so that it cannot be used again. Bank B issues
a new bill to agent B for the same amount. Agent B is now satis ed.
If agent A does not have a combination of bills that sum to the correct amount, it can break
one of its larger bills into smaller bills by sending the bill to bank A.
Note that neither of the banks need know or validate the identity of the agents, only the currency.

4.4 Arbitrated Transactions

To prevent cheating, where agent B accepts the money without providing the service, or where
agent A uses the service and then refuses to pay, we add a trusted third-party arbiter to the
transaction (see Figure 1). This arbiter is especially useful when the two agents are exchanging
large amounts of currency, or have reason to mistrust each other. When the arbiter is involved, both
agents A and B are required to send some collateral currency to the arbiter. After it receives the
collateral from both agents, the arbiter noti es both agents. The agents complete their transaction.
If either agent complains within the pre-agreed time, the arbiter retains the other agent's collateral.
At the end of the waiting period, the arbiter returns the collateral to each agent if the other agent
had not complained. It is not in the best interest of an agent to cheat the other agent, because it
loses its collateral. It is also not in the best interest of an agent to complain arbitrarily, since it
will not gain anything, and the other party will simply retaliate and cause the rst agent to lose
5

its collateral also. An audit trail by the arbiter allows a nal (human) source for reconciliation of
disputes.
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Figure 1: The arbiter protocol is used to prevent cheating. Agent A requests a service from Agent B.
To start the transaction, Agent A gives the arbiter the cost of the service plus a given amount of ecash collateral and Agent B gives the arbiter that same amount of e-cash collateral. Upon successful
completion of the transaction, the Arbiter Agent returns the collateral to Agent A and Agent B.

4.5 Resource Managers

In D'Agents, nearly everything can be viewed as a resource. Some resources are closely tied to the
hardware, and others represent abstract services. Most resources come in units, and most units
involve time in some form. Example resources include CPU time (cycles or cycles per second of
real time), main memory (byte-seconds), disk space (KByte-seconds), screen space (pixel-seconds),
speaker (seconds), microphone (seconds), keyboard (seconds), network transmission (byte-seconds),
database access (records searched), and so forth.
Each resource has a manager. Each resource manager is responsible for a particular resource
(or class of resource) and elds all requests for access to that resource. Its sole job is to determine
whether access should be granted, and to determine any limits on the access. For example, the CPU
resource manager decides whether the agent may run at all, and if so, a limit on the total number
of CPU seconds as well on the rate (virtual-time CPU second per real-time second). Once the
decision has been made, it is the responsibility of the agent run-time system to enforce the decision.
In addition to its duties regarding access control, the manager is responsible for setting and/or
negotiating a price that it charges for the resource, and for collecting funds from the agent. So far
we have used the price set by a human con guring the resource managers. In Section 5 we describe
our experiments using auctions to allow the resource managers to dynamically set prices based on
supply, demand, and \market conditions," such as the prices it sees o ered by its \competitors".
In D'Agents we use the Safe-Tcl [BR95] infrastructure to enforce the decisions of the resource
managers [Gra96]. The Safe-Tcl kernel interpreter intercepts sensitive procedure calls. On the rst
access, it asks the resource manager for its decision; it caches the decision to avoid asking the resource
6

manager on subsequent resource accesses. This architecture cleanly separates the mechanism (Safe
Tcl) and the policy (resource managers), allowing convenient substitution of di erent policies, and
allowing the resource managers to remain independent of the programming language.
All of these mechanisms exist in early prototype form. We plan more experiments to measure
the performance of the mechanisms, and more importantly, to design and implement pricing policies
within the resource managers.
The agents circulating in this environment have the opportunity to plan their activities based
on the priorities provided by their originator (such as fastest completion time, lowest price, most
detailed information, and so forth), the amount of currency they can spend, and the current price of
resources. An agent with a goal for fast completion time, for example, may choose an algorithm that
optimizes computation time at the expense of memory usage; if the price of memory is particularly
high at this site, however, it may choose to jump to an equivalent but cheaper site, or it may choose
an algorithm that uses less memory but runs longer.

4.6 Application: The Traveling Salesperson

We have developed a multi-agent application that uses the banking system discussed in this paper
for a traveling salesperson scenario. The premise of the application is a traveling salesperson that
carries a laptop when visiting customers and uses software that helps to select vendors and products,
prepare a quote, and place orders. Agents represent orders and travel to the corporation's computers
where they interact with billing, inventory, and shipping agents to arrange for the purchase. Agents
are also used to explore the vendor catalogs and search for products that meet the customer's needs.
In all cases, the agents are mobile and can function while the salesperson's laptop is disconnected
[RGK].
Figure 2 shows the structure of the application. The traveling salesperson can gather information
about a particular type of purchase by sending an agent to locate all the vendors of the required type
of product. The agents locate vendors by interacting with a distributed system of yellow pages, and
bring back the most recent catalogs from the vendors. The catalogs are displayed as an interactive
window, in which the salesperson can select items. The selected items are packaged as an order
agent. This agent travels to the vendor locations and purchases the required items. This is done by
paying electronic cash, using the banking system described in Section 4.2 and the arbiter protocol
described in Section 4.4. When the transaction is complete, the agent returns to the salesperson's
computer with the purchased items (sound clips in our prototype), which can be played locally. If
the transaction cannot be completed, the agent returns to the salesperson to report on its status.

5 Dynamic Pricing
Resource manages can set the price of the resources they control by using (a) xed-pricing strategies
provided at the initialization of the system and possibly changed by the human users, or (b) by
using dynamic pricing strategies that allow them to adapt to the supply and demand in the system.
In this section we describe our work on dynamic pricing and illustrate it with simulation results.
Dynamic pricing is important for several reasons. First, we expect that it will be dicult to
set prices manually that lead to a stable, healthy agent economy. Second, the system will change
constantly, as resource supplies change (machines come and go) and resource demand changes
7
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Figure 2: The architecture of the salesperson application.
(agents come and go). Indeed, there will clearly be daily and weekly cycles of activity: CPU time
may be more expensive the middle of a workday than in the wee hours of Sunday morning. In
addition, our experience with the World Wide Web shows that some resources are \hot" one day
and not the next: e.g., a hurricane tends to make the weather-information servers busier.

5.1 Market Models for Resource Control

There are four primary approaches to dynamic pricing. Here, the seller is usually a resource manager, and the buyer is usually an agent.
1. Seller-adjusted pricing: in this approach, the seller monitors the demand for its services,
adjusting the price up as demand increases and down as demand decreases. It may also
be able to determine the price of competitors, and factor that into its computation. This
could be a simple, ad hoc, information-poor approach. Nonetheless, it may be useful in some
circumstances.
2. Negotiation: in this approach the seller and the buyer negotiate over each sale. The challenge
here is to understand how the buyer, in particular, knows what prices are reasonable when it
starts the negotiation. This approach could be implemented as a simple double auction like
in the stock exchange.
8

3. Seller-driven auctions: auctions are feasible when there are many buyers competing for the
same item (resource), particularly when there are more buyers than there are items.
4. Buyer-driven auctions: in these auctions, there are many sellers and relatively few buyers.
The sellers broadcast their prices, essentially bidding for buyers, and the buyers choose to
buy from the cheapest sellers (for example, [CMM97]).
In the following section we discuss our work on seller-driven auctions.

5.2 Dynamic Pricing with Auctions

Auctions provide a market-based mechanism for controlling resources. In auctions, the buyers
are allowed to competitively set the price for goods being sold, although the seller may have a
reservation price below which sale will not occur. By asking the buyers for the price, the seller
needs no information about current market demand and is able to capitalize on close to all of
market demand.
In this section, we explore the use of auctions as a preliminary solution for resource control in
a distributed agent environment. We examine various properties of sealed-bid second-price auction
markets and their bene t to multi-agent systems.
Several types of auctions can be considered to drive dynamic pricing in a distributed agent
system. In the standard English auction the seller openly announces a minimal price for the good
to be sold. Buyers then take turns publicly bidding or exiting the auction. Bids submitted are
strictly increasing over time and sale occurs when only one potential buyer remains. Strategically,
the optimal solution is for bidding to continue until the bidder willing to pay the most over-bids
her competitors and pays the value of the next-closest participant.
While English auctions are ecient in extracting buyer values, they often take many rounds to
complete and thus can be inecient for agents. Instead, we use the sealed-bid second-price auction
proposed by Vickery [Vic61]. The sealed-bid second-price auction is strategically identical to the
English auction but it requires only a single round of bidding. Buyers privately submit their own
valuations. The winner is the competitor submitting the highest bid, though the price of the good
is the highest losing bid.
The best strategy for this type of auction is to submit a bid equal to the value of the good. There
is no incentive to bid any lower; doing so only decreases the chance of victory without any e ect on
the quality of a successful auction, since the winner pays the loser's bid. Bidding higher than one's
value is dangerous and risks over-payment (a fate worse than losing the auction.) Strategically, the
English auction is equivalent to the sealed-bid second-price auction.
The side e ect of sealed-bid second-price auctions is the near elimination of deadweight loss
associated with competitive markets and the exclusion of potential buyers. By using only a single
price, some potential buyers are excluded. Of course, it is not normally advantageous to sell below
cost, but often times sellers set a price well above the real cost of their wares. Additionally, most
expenses in a computational environment are sunk. For example, it costs the same to operate a busy
CPU as it does an idle one. Conversely, some buyers would be willing to pay larger amounts than
the price the seller is asking. The di erence between what the buyer is willing to pay and the actual
price is called economic rent . This potential revenue lost is known as deadweight loss and indicates
ineciency in the market. The rightmost shaded triangle in Figure 3 represents deadweight loss in
a competitive market.
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Figure 3: Simple supply and demand curves showing the utility acquired by consumers and producers as well as the loss incurred through setting a single price. The area denoted as deadweight
loss shows unused demand by setting a single price while consumer surplus is the region showing
how much more customers would have been willing to pay.
Since conducting a second-price auction forces buyers to pay very close to their evaluations,
almost all potential revenue is collected by the seller. Only the gap in bids between the highest
and second highest buyers is lost. Given enough competition, this gap should close, and the sellers'
revenue increases.
Thus deadweight loss is practically eliminated through auction pricing suggesting that the market is extremely ecient in resource allocation. If resources are so scarce that there are more
requests than goods, it makes sense to favor those users with higher priorities, especially when one
considers that computer programs rarely feature graceful degradation and failure in one portion of
execution often overwhelmingly corrupts the program's overall performance.

5.3 Modeling Auctions for Resource Allocation

To model and analyze the scope of sealed-bid second-price auctions for resource control we have
developed a model and used simulation to evaluate it. In this model, many agents we will call client
agents request service from resource managers we call server agents. All the servers sell a common
resource called the service. Prices in this model are xed with respect to quantity. Our model makes
two assumptions. The rst assumption is that the demand for the service is completely inelastic
with respect to quantity. That is, users are willing to pay the same price per unit regardless of
quantity. This assumption makes sense if the system is to be used in an environment where all work
presented to the system must be completed. The second assumption is that clients have enough
electronic cash to complete their schedule of requests, but are stingy in that they wish to conserve
their currency pool.
Since prices are xed with respect to quantity, the only way to a ect the price is quality. Goodness of service is measured by computing the price/performance ratio. Performance, in this model,
is calculated as the time elapsed between the service request and service completion, normalized for
the quantity requested. In this model, every client has an expectation of performance with respect
to per unit prices based on previous experiences.
A measure that connects price and quality of service allows the clients to trade expenditure
for performance, but further speci cation is necessary for users to be able to evaluate a good. In
10

our model, clients have threshold for the level of service for which they are willing to pay. This
threshold is described for every client as an isoquant curve in the price performance space | a
curve upon which every point is equally desirable. Figure 4 shows an example of such a threshold.
The threshold is used by clients to determine what is an acceptable price for a service request.

price

unacceptable

acceptable
time

Figure 4: A sample curve describing a client's preference regarding price and performance.

5.4 Analyzing the Model

To understand the possible e ect of sealed-bid second-price auctions on resource control in multiagent systems, we compute the buyer's waiting time (average and variance) to measure the stability
and distribution of wealth in the market. For simplicity, we assume that the request size is exponentially distributed and that the distribution is common to all client agents. Also, the request-arrival
rates follow a Poisson distribution, using the same distribution for all client agents.
Consider for simplicity the case of one server (resource manager) and n clients (agents requesting
the resource). Suppose the mean service-size request is  and it occurs with mean frequency f .
The expected wait time of the richest client is simply the server utilization times  since the client
willing to spend the most has only to wait for the user currently being serviced to complete.
The rest of the clients' expected waiting time is a bit more complex to calculate. The following
results holds:

Theorem 5.1 (Lower Bounds)In a sealed-bid second-price auction where clients have approximately the same request patterns, the lower bound for waiting time is exponential with respect to
spending rank.

Proof:

To simplify this exposition, suppose that clients' spend unique amounts with respect to each
other. The analysis can be extended for the general case as well.
The variables that a ect a client's waiting time are the ordinality of the client's spending compared to the competition (in other words, how many clients are willing to spend more than the
current client) and the expected time for the server to service all clients with higher bids. It is
possible to derive the expected wait time for any particular client given the expected time to service
all the clients with higher bids.
The utilization of a M/M/1 queued server is just the Poisson ratio function:
11
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(1)

[Tan95, p. 244] where K is the number of clients in the system and z is the service ratio (the time
taken between service requests, divided by time taken up by service). So z is:
1
z=
(2)
f

Since the arrival times are randomly independently distributed, the chance that a client requests
service when the n clients with higher bids are idle is:
1 ; R(n; 1 )
(3)
f

An approximation for the expected wait time for the nth richest client follows by noting that
the system is memoryless and that the probability that the server will be able to serve a client is
the utilization. Integrating over time we get the expected wait time:
Z

1

0

(1 ;  ) tt dt
0

(4)

0

Where  = R(n ; 1; z), is approximately the utilization of the queue by the n ; 1 clients with
higher bids. This computation ignores the possibility that there could be a client with a lower bid
being served at the time of arrival, but it serves as a lower bound on expected wait time and the
approximation is more accurate for the very poor and the very rich clients.
Equation 4 integrates to:
0

"

#1

1 ;  et  (t ; 1= ln  ) = 1 ; 
(5)
ln 
(ln  )
By substituting Equation 1 into Equation 5 for  , we obtain the expected wait time as a function
of expenditure rank, assuming that all clients have roughly the same request patterns. The resulting
function for wait time is an exponential lower bound with respect to spending rank. Figure 5 plots
expenditure rank versus expected wait time with request frequency 0.05 and request service time
2. Thus the service ratio, z, is 9. The wait times for the poorer clients are very severe compared to
those of the wealthy because, in the estimation, the consumption of the poor have no e ect on the
rich. 2
0

ln

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

5.5 Simulation Results

To verify the result in Theorem 5.1 we built a simulation of the sealed-bid second-price auction for
one resource manager server and eight client agents. The client agents have unique preferences as
assumed above. Given the spread in expected wait times modeling preferences in this manner is
somewhat tricky. In congested scenarios, the poorer clients are not able to obtain service that for
which they are willing to pay.
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Figure 5: Plot of spending rank versus estimated expected wait time with z = 9 and logarithmic
scale.
Congestion is an important issue for mobile agents. Intuitively, it is easy to observe that all
agents using a given service are a ected by congestion at all levels of spending. Richer client agents
have to wait at most the current service time of a poorer clients plus the additional wait incurred
by wealthier clients arriving in that time, so the estimation still serves as lower bound on expected
wait time.
Figures 6 and 7 show simulation data for how spending rank determines average wait time. The
plots are consistent with Theorem 5.1. We note that in this experiment, the eighth client in the
scenario experienced lengthy enough wait times that caused its evaluation of service to fall negative,
so it left the market.

6 Discussion
It is interesting to consider the implications of a system in which the agent currency is tied to legal
currency (e.g., U.S. Dollars). Indeed, it is almost inevitable. Consider an individual that buys
an expensive and powerful workstation, and hooks it into the global agent system. The hardware
resources of that workstation are assets that quickly earn the individual agent currency. Thus,
the legal currency spent to purchase the workstation are translated into agent currency. The user
may now spend the agent currency to send agents out into the system. Or, perhaps the user
can sell the agent currency to another user, perhaps a user who has only a minimal workstation
and thus little potential to gain currency, in exchange for legal currency. As a result, all of the
world's computational resources are sharable! Individuals can decide whether to own and maintain
a workstation of their own, or to \rent" services from other machines.
The use of sealed-bid auctions is just a simple rst implementation of a market system. It is
unclear whether auctions provide sucient incentive for processes to balance and smooth system
wide consumption; allowing users to set their own prices gives little motivation to move given
13
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Figure 6: Plot of spending rank versus average wait time for simulation of eight clients and one
server.
any consumption. However, mobile agent systems provide an enormous opportunity for modeling
economic systems and games.
We will implement these and perhaps other approaches to experiment with their feasibility in
the systems and applications that we envision. It is likely that a hybrid approach will be necessary:
for example, to use seller-adjusted pricing when the competition is fairly light, but to switch to an
auction when the demand overwhelms the supply.
Needless to say, in a real system not all of the agents and resource managers will use the same
algorithm for negotiation, bidding, or price setting. We are particularly interested in the e ects on
an economy when di erent algorithms clash with each other, or (in the worst case) when a malicious
or buggy agent or service uses an irrational algorithm.
Clearly, there is a tremendous amount of work necessary to understand the policies and mechanisms necessary to manage all of the resources in a complex, distributed, agent system. We believe
that the currency model has tremendous potential, and that our experimental study will lead to a
deeper understanding of that potential as well as concrete suggestions for implementation in a real
system.
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